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This paper examines the influence of auditor brand name proxied by the Big4 auditors 
on financial reporting fraud represented by discretionary accruals (DA). We employ 88 
listed companies in Nigeria through 440 firm-year observations for the period of five 
years from 2012 to 2016. The data for the study are extracted from the annual reports 
of the listed companies and Thompson Reuters DataStream. We adopt accruals model 
to proxy for financial reporting fraud. Multiple regression is used to estimate the model 
of the study. After controlling for monitoring and firm-specific attributes, we find that 
non-Big4 auditors are more likely to detect financial fraud as they might have more 
excellent knowledge of local markets and better relations with their clients. Consistent 
with the resource dependence theory, we find that a high proportion of financial 
experts on the board reduces the extent of financial reporting fraud, thus leading to 
better financial reporting quality. The study informs regulators and policymakers on 
the importance of auditor brand name in curtailing financial reporting fraud in the 
listed companies of Nigeria. The findings are robust to the alternative estimation. The 
results contribute to the debate on the role of auditor brand name in curtailing 
financial reporting fraud. 
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Financial reporting fraud is one of the major threats in the contemporary business world. It is a 
situation where companies are engrossed in specific premeditated practices to conceal or manipulate 
the accounts to mislead or attract investors. Financial reporting is a dual process, where suppliers of 
the financial information make it available to the users, who use them with the hope that it will assist 
them to improve their financial decisions [1]. The objective of financial reporting is to prepare 
financial statements about the firm that are relevant to stakeholders in making decisions in their 
positions as capital providers [2]. Thus, financial reports are imperative means for managers to 
communicate a company’s performance and governance to external investors [2]. Therefore, 
providing high financial reporting quality is imperative since it will affect stakeholders in generating 
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investment, credit and making similar resource allocation decisions to enhance overall market 
productivity. 
Invariably, a financial report should not be deliberately prepared to deceive the users; it must 
convey pertinent, reliable and appropriate information to support users in decision-making. Thus, for 
financial statements to be pertinent and dependable, there is the need to make available some 
means to encourage the practice of better financial reporting processes. For that, there is need to 
engage the services of independent auditors to provide their independent views on the accuracy and 
objectivity of companies’ financial reports.  This will function as a substitute for the monitoring 
mechanism that can enrich financial reporting, and in turn, raise stakeholders’ confidence about the 
firm’s performance and its image.  It is argued that disclosure can assist in mitigating principal-agent 
conflicts [3]. This is because high-quality information is likely to lessen asymmetric information 
problems between the firm and its investors, and accordingly, cut the agency costs [4]. However, the 
anxiety about the financial reporting quality as well as its association with audit quality has been 
growing over time because of the collapse of some prominent corporations due to financial fraud by 
its managers. As a result of this, regulators and stakeholders often question the work of external 
auditors as the audited financial statements have been affirmed to be deceitful and misleading in 
several recent financial scandals [5, 6]. Therefore, there is a need to examine how audit quality can 
influence management fraud, which has an adverse effect on financial reporting quality. 
As a result of the foregoing statements, this study examines the relationship between auditor 
brand name proxied by the Big4 and financial reporting fraud represented by the earnings 
management (EM) model. The study is motivated by the recent rapid increase and dominance of Big 
4 auditors in the audit market in Nigeria. However, the question of whether Big N auditors provide 
higher financial reporting quality than the non-Big N auditors has remained a debatable issue [7]. 
This paper is divided into five sections. Section one provides the introduction, section two reviews 
the literature and hypothesis development, section three explains the methodology and model 
specification, followed by results and discussions in section four and conclusion in section five.  
 
2.  Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2. 1 Auditor Brand Name and Financial Reporting Fraud 
 
Audit quality is tantamount to greater assurance of high financial reporting quality. For instance, 
DeAngelo [8] defined audit quality as the “market-assessed joint probability that a given auditor will 
both detect a breach in the client’s accounting system, and report the breach”. As such, high quality 
audit is known for its independent assurance of the steadfastness of financial reports, which in turn, 
promotes investors’ protection and enhances their confidence. Thus, audit quality improves financial 
reporting quality  by enhancing the integrity of the financial reports [8, 9]. DeFond et al., [9] contends 
that audit quality is an incessant construct of financial reporting quality. They also argue that financial 
reporting quality is a function of audit quality. This suggests that audit quality and financial reporting 
quality are jointly perceptible outcomes. Consequently, many proxies have been adopted by various 
studies as measures of audit quality. However, there are inconclusive arguments on which measures 
are superior, and thus, there are limited methodical directions on the comparability of one proxy as 
opposed to another [8, 9]. Audit quality is categorized into input-based, output-based and 
perception-based measurements. The latter comprises the earnings responses, big N auditors and 
stock market reactions. The input-based measurement consists of audit firm size proxied by Big4 
auditors and audit fees. In contrast, the output-based measurement includes accounting 
conservatism, restatements, audit opinion, accruals quality, big N auditors, audit fees and market 
reactions.  
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In the light of the preceding, we suggest auditor brand name proxied by the Big4 auditors as a 
surrogate for audit quality due to the following reasons: 
i. It is one of the surrogates that appears in all the above three classifications; and 
ii. Big4 auditors is a robust proxy for audit quality because such auditors are expected to have 
strong motivation and greater proficiencies to deliver high-quality audit [8] Thus, it has fairly 
greater construct validity [9]. 
The foregoing arguments are empirically confirmed by most of the prior studies on audit quality 
and financial reporting quality. They indicate that employment of Big N auditors is connected to lower 
EM and higher financial reporting quality. This is affirmed by Frankel et al., [11] who examined the 
influence of audit fees and EM in the US. The study shows Big5 audit firms have an inversely 
significant influence on EM. This is validated by Carmona et al., [12] who examined the effect of audit 
quality in Spain. The finding indicates that Big4 auditors have an inverse and significant relationship 
with abnormal accruals. This suggests that companies audited by Big4 auditors display less EM than 
companies audited by non-Big4 [12,14]. In contrast, Abdullah et al., [15] contend that EM is 
significantly low among firms that engage the services of Big4 auditors than firms audited by non-
Big4 auditors. From the emerging markets, Abidin et al., [17] studied the effect of auditor’s industrial 
specialization and reporting lag in Malaysia for year 2007. They reveal that Big4 auditors are inversely 
and significantly associated with audit reporting lag. This infers that firms audited by Big4 auditors 
have better inclination to faster reporting. This is confirmed by a recent study of Amahalu et al., [18] 
who examined the determinants of audit quality among listed banks in Nigeria. They reveal that Big4 
auditors have a positively significant influence on audit quality.  
In contrast, recent empirical evidences have shown that firms audited by Big4 auditors are more 
likely to engage in financial reporting fraud in the form of DA and income smoothing practice. For 
instance, Ozili [19]  examined income smoothing and audit quality of African banks. He reveals that 
African banks that were audited by the Big4 have more probability of smoothing their reported 
earnings than those banks that were audited by the non-Big4. This validates the findings of [19-21] 
who document a positive association between Big4 auditors and earnings manipulation by firms. 
More so, Ishak et al., [21] studied the influence of leadership organization, gender variety and audit 
quality on earnings manipulation of listed entities in Malaysia. They argue that engaging Big4 auditors 
to audit listed firms in Malaysia does not curtail managers’ fraud in the form of EM. This affirms the 
finding of Abidin et al., [17] who reveal that Big4 auditors do not minimize audit reporting delay in 
the listed firms in Malaysia. Thus, in the light of the foregoing arguments, it is hypothesized that: 
H1 Auditor brand name has a negative relationship with financial reporting fraud of listed companies 
in Nigeria.  
 
3. Methodology  
  
The population comprises 170 listed companies on the Nigerian Stock Exchange as at 31st 
December 2016. From this total, 55 companies were identified as financial services; thus they were 
left out, leaving a total of 115 companies. Furthermore, 15 companies were delisted by the Nigerian 
Stock Exchange in 2016. After subtracting these 15 delisted firms, 100 companies were left. Out of 
these 100 firms, 12 companies did not provide complete information. Consequently, a final sample 
of 88 companies was employed. The period of study covers five years from 2012 to 2016. This period 
was selected as it covers the aftershocks of the financial scandals by Cadbury Nigeria PLC in 2006, 
African Petroleum PLC in 2009 and the more recent Stanbic IBTC PLC in 2015. The data for the study 
were generated from the annual reports of the listed companies and Thompson Reuters DataStream. 
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3.1 Model Specification and Variable Measurement 
For the purpose of the study, we follow Al- Rassas and Dechow et al., [23, 24]  by adopting the 
accruals model developed by [24] to serve as a technique for detecting financial reporting fraud. The 
error terms of the model represent the absolute discretionary accruals. This is estimated as 
 
TACi,t/TAi,t-1 = β1(1/TAi,t-1) + β2(∆REVi,t-∆RECi,t/TAi,t-1) + β3(∆PPEi,t/TAi,t-1) + εi,t    (1) 
     
where: TAC = Total accruals computed as net earnings minus cash flow from operations; TAi,t-1 = 
Lagged of total assets of a firm; ∆REV = changes in turnover from present year to last year; ∆REC = 
changes in receivables from present year to last year; and PPE = gross property plant and equipment. 
After the extraction of the residuals, the following estimation model was run to examine the 
influence of auditor brand name on financial reporting fraud. 
 
DAit = β0 + β1AUBNit + β2BIit + β3BEit + β4LEVit + β5FAGEit + β6SGROWTHit +εit    (2) 
 
where: DA = absolute discretionary accruals from equation 1; AUBN is measured as 1 when a 
company is audited by the Big4 (KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst & Young and Deloitte) and 
otherwise, 0; BI = board independence computed as ratio of independent directors on the board; BE 
= board financial expertise computed as ratio of financial experts on the board; LEV = leverage 
computed as long-term debt to total equity; FAGE = computed as year of observation minus year of 
listing; SGROWTH = Sales growth measured as log of sales; β0 = Intercept, β = parameters;i = firm; t 




Variable  Acronym Definition Source 
Dependent: 
 






Discretionary accruals  
 
 
[15], [23], [26] 
Independent: 
 






Big 4 auditor 
 
 
[12], [16], [26] 
 
Control    
Board independence BI Percentage of independent 
directors on the board  
[27], [28] 
Board financial expertise BE Proportion of financial 
experts on the board 
[29], [27], [28]  
Leverage LEV Total debt to total equity [30], [31]  
Firm age AGE Measured as the year of 
observation minus listing 
[33], [35] 
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4. Results and Discussion 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2 portrays the descriptive statistics of the study variables. Table 2 shows that DA has an 
average value of 2.385 with the smallest and largest values of 0.525 and 6.397, respectively. It is 
revealed that the majority of the listed firms in Nigeria were audited by the Big4 auditors. BI has a 
mean of 0.715 with lowest and largest values of 0.060 and 0.923, respectively. This suggests that 
more than 70% of directors on the board of listed companies in Nigeria are independent directors. 
This indicates compliance with the stipulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission Code of 
Corporate Governance (SEC CCG) (2011) which recommends that the majority of directors should be 
independent directors.  
BE has an average value of 50% with the least and extreme values of 25% and 75%, respectively. 
This also implies that 50% of board members are financial experts. LEV has a mean value of 0.067, 
while some companies report no LEV but others record up to 0.580. FAGE has a mean of 24 years 
with smallest and highest values of four to 42 years, respectively. SGROWTH has an average value of 
4.036 and a minimum and maximum of 7.093 and 13.790, respectively. The next subsection describes 
the corrections matrix. 
 
Table 2  
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable   Obs. Mean   Std. Dev. Min Max 
DA  440 2.385 0.998 0.525 6.397 
AUBN 440 0.580 0.494 0.000 1.000 
BI 440 0.715 0.112 0.060 0.923 
BE 440 0. 500 0.140 0.250 0.750 
LEV 440 0.067 0.611 0.000 0.580 
FAGE 440 23.818 13.288 4.000 42.000 
SGROWTH 440 4.036 6.397 7.093 13.790 
Note: DA= discretionary accruals from equation; AUBN = (KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst & Young and Deloitte); BI = board 
independence; BE = board financial expertise; LEV = leverage; FAGE = firm age; SGROWTH = sales growth. 
 
4.2 Correlation Matrix  
 
The correlation matrix in Table 3 reveals that AUBN has a strong and positive correlation with DA. 
This association is significant at 5%. Thus, this provides a key clue on the direction of the relationship 
between AUBN and DA in the regression model. Table 3 reveals that BE is negatively and significantly 
correlated with DA at the 10% level of significance.  Also, BI and LEV have an insignificantly positive 
correlation with DA. In contrast, FAGE and SGROWTH have an insignificantly negative correlation 
with DA. 
However, the results of the VIF test in Table 4 reveal that the tolerance values and the variance 
inflation factor are less than 1 and less than 10, respectively, endorsing that multicollinearity might 
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Table 3  
Correlation Matrix  
DA AUBN BI BE LEV FAGE SGROWTH 
DA 1.000 
      
AUBN 0.095** 1.000 
     
 
0.048 
      
BI 0.009 0.094** 1.000 
    
 
0.846 0.050 
     
BE -0.078* 0.184*** 0.185*** 1.000 
   
 
0.100 0.000 0.000 
    
LEV 0.030 -0.003 0.050 0.030 1.000 
  
 
0.526 0.953 0.300 0.530 
   
FAGE -0.057 0.060 0.041 0.130*** 0.058 1.000 
 
 
0.235 0.211 0.393 0.007 0.224 
  
SGROWTH -0.013 0.032 0.039 0.062 -0.008 -0.072 1.000 
 
0.792 0.504 0.412 0.193 0.870 0.131 
 
Note: DA = discretionary accruals from equation; AUBN = (KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst & Young and Deloitte); BI = board 




Variable VIF VIF Tolerance Squared 
AUBN 1.050 1.030 0.948 0.052 
BI 1.040 1.020 0.959 0.041 
BE 1.090 1.050 0.914 0.087 
LEV 1.010 1.000 0.993 0.007 
FAGE 1.030 1.020 0.969 0.031 
SGROWTH 1.010 1.010 0.988 0.012 
Mean VIF 1.040 
   
Note: AUBN = (KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst & Young and Deloitte); BI = board independence; BE = board financial expertise; 
LEV = leverage; FAGE = firm age; SGROWTH = sales growth. 
 
4.3 Univariate Comparison 
 
To further justify the results obtained from the descriptive statistics and correlation analysis, the 
study ran an independent t-test. Table 5 presents the results of the two-sample t-test with equal 
variances. The results from Table 5 reveal that there is a statistically significant difference between 
the two brand-name auditor (Big4 and non-Big4) at 5%. This is observed from the Table, indicating a 
p-value of 0.048 and average values of 2.276 and 2.466 for non-Big4 and Big4, respectively. The 
average value of 2.466 for the Big4 auditors indicates that the DA of firms that were audited by the 
Big4 auditors are higher than those audited by the non-Big4 auditors. The result can serve as an 
additional clue about the influence of auditor brand name on financial reporting fraud in the 
regression model. 
4.4 Regression Results 
Table 6 presents the regression results of the influence of auditor brand name and financial 
reporting fraud proxied by DA. AUBN shows a significantly positive relationship with DA. This is 
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observed from the Table 6 which discloses a regression coefficient and p-value of β> 0.238 and 0.045, 
respectively. This shows that AUBN is positively and significantly related to DA at the 5% level of 
significance. This implies that AUBN proxied by the Big4 auditors increases the probability of firms’ 
managers manipulating their earnings through DA. This finding also suggests that non-Big4 auditors 
are more likely to decrease financial reporting fraud in the listed companies in Nigeria. 
 
Table 5 
Univariate Comparison between Big4 and Non-Big4 Audited Firms 
Group Observations Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. 
Non-Big4     0 185 2.276 0.066 0.895 
Big4             1 255 2.466 0.066 1.055 





T-value -1.987  
  




The Relationship between Auditor Brand Name and Financial Reporting Fraud 
DA Coef. Std. Err.      T>Value P>Value VIF 1/VIF 
AUBN 0.238 0.082 2.890** 0.045 1.090 0.921 
BI 0.165 0.131 1.270 0.275 1.040 0.959 
BE -0.692 0.205 -3.370** 0.028 1.040 0.961 
LEV 0.092 0.145 0.640 0.559 1.030 0.972 
FAGE -0.004 0.002 -1.890 0.132 1.010 0.988 
SGROWTH 0.000 0.000 -1.470 0.216 1.010 0.994 
Cons 2.569 0.194 13.260*** 0.000   
R2 0.026      
F-Stat 6.830      
P-Value(F) 0.042      
Hettest(Chi2) 39823      
P-Value 0.000      
Mean VIF 1.040      
Observation 440 440 440 440 440 440 
Note: DA= discretionary accruals from equation 1; AUBN = (KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst & Young and Deloitte); BI = board 
independence; BE = board financial expertise; LEV = leverage; FAGE = firm age; SGROWTH = sales growth. 
 
A potential elucidation for these results may be that a considerable number of the sample firms 
were audited by the Big4 who might have lesser information of the local markets compared to non-
Big4 auditors. This might produce a vacuum since non-Big4 auditors could have more excellent 
knowledge of local markets and better relationship with their clients. Thus, this may assist Big4 
auditors to better identify irregularities in companies. Another possible explanation of the finding 
can be linked to the tenure of external auditors established by the SEC CCG (2011) which stipulates 
that external auditors could be engaged by companies for consecutive periods, subject to a maximum 
of 10 years. This duration may be considered too long as the exceptionally long tenure of external 
auditors might impair their independence because the longer they stay as auditors of the same firm, 
the more likely for them to be networking with the management and thus become less critical of 
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financial issues. Comparably, prior studies Amahalu et al., Ozili, Bruynseels et al., and Ishak et al., [18-
21] find that Big4 auditors are positively related to DA. 
Table 6 shows that BI is positively but insignificantly related to DA. This implies that the 
proportion of independent directors on the board might not limit managers’ opportunistic behaviour 
toward earnings of listed companies in Nigeria. This confirms the finding of [35, 39]. BE is negatively 
and significantly related to DA, having a regression coefficient and p-value of β >-0.692 and p > 0.028, 
respectively. Consequently, the results support the agency and resource dependence theories which 
recommend that high proportion of financial experts is imperative for enriching board monitoring 
since it leads to better financial reporting quality [41]. LEV is found to be positively but insignificantly 
related to DA. The result contradicts the argument that highly leveraged firms have inclination to 
reduce DA. FAGE and SGROWTH show reversal of signs in the model with FAGE having a negatively 
insignificant relationship with AUBN and SGROWTH, a positively insignificant relationship. This 
suggests that FAGE and SGROWTH have no meaningful effect on DA of listed companies in Nigeria. 
The result is consistent with the findings of Puat et al., and Pfeffer and Salancik [41, 42]; while Sun et 
al., [44] find a negatively significant relationship between SGROWTH and DA. Gao et al., and [35, Sun 
et al., [44] find a negatively insignificant relationship between FAGE and DA. 
 
4.5 Additional Analysis 
 
An alternative measure of estimation was employed because the data used in the study comprise 
time-variant and firm-specific data.  This may lead to inaccuracy that is clustered and correlated over 
time. Thus, the effect of the outcome variable and the predictor variables might be exaggerated, thus 
leading to distortive conclusions [46]. Consequently, “heteroskedasticity robust standard error 
clustered across firms” was adopted to re-estimate the prior model. Table 7 presents the results of 
alternative estimation as additional analysis.  It can be perceived from Table 7 that the signs of all the 
parameters of the primary model are noticeably similar to those of the additional analysis. Therefore, 
it is established that our results of the relationship between auditor brand name and financial 
reporting fraud are robust to alternative estimation. 
 
Table 7 
Alternative Estimation on the Relationship between Auditor Brand Name and Financial Reporting Fraud  
DA Coef. Robust 
Std. Err. 
T>Value P>Value 
AUBN 0.230 0.096 2.390** 0.019 
BI 0.152 0.326 0.470 0.641 
BE -0.676 0.354 -1.910* 0.059 
LEV 0.058 0.094 0.620 0.539 
FAGE -0.004 0.004 -1.130 0.261 
SGROWTH 0.000 0.000 -1.930* 0.057 
Cons 2.577 0.240 10.720*** 0.000 
R2 0.023    
F-Stat 2.350    
P-Value(F) 0.038    
Observation 440 440 440 440 
Note: DA= discretionary accruals from equation 1; AUBN = (KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst & Young and Deloitte); BI = board 
independence; BE = board financial expertise; LEV = leverage; FAGE = firm age; SGROWTH = sales growth. 
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Financial reporting fraud is one of the major threats in the contemporary business world. It is an 
intentional falsification, omission or distortion of financial figures or disclosures of financial reports 
to deceive financial reporting users, predominantly investors and creditors. Thus, this paper 
examines the influence of auditor brand name (Big4 and non-Big4) on the financial fraud of listed 
companies in Nigeria. After controlling for monitoring and firm-specific attributes, we find that Big4 
auditors are less likely to detect financial reporting fraud as they might have limited knowledge of 
local markets compared to non-Big4 auditors. Our finding is consistent with the resource dependence 
and agency theories which suggest that higher proportion of financial experts on the board decreases 
the magnitude of financial reporting fraud, thus, leading to better financial reporting quality. Our 
results of the relationship between auditor brand name and financial reporting fraud are robust to 
alternative estimation. The study provides insights to policymakers and regulators about the 
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